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Abstract. This paper deals with VoIP communication
security and various techniques of VoIP attacks. We
divided these threats in several categories according to
their specific behaviour and their impact on the affected
system. We also tried to find effective methods to prevent
or mitigate these attacks. We focused our work on Spam
over Internet Telephony (SPIT) as a real threat for the
future. We have developed both a tool generating SPIT
attacks and AntiSPIT tool defending communication
systems against SPIT attacks. AntiSPIT represents an
effective protection based on statistical blacklist and works
without participation of the called party which is a
significant advantage.
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1. Introduction
Voice over Internet Protocol is without any doubts a
step ahead in communication technologies. But similarly
to other technologies, there should be certain specific rules
and security measures otherwise the technology does not
work properly. Nowadays, SIP protocol is the most
frequently used signaling protocol in IP telephony,
however it is prone to attacks as described below. We can
divide these attacks into several categories based on the
threat behavior [1]:
· Scanning and Enumerating a VoIP Network.
· Exploiting the VoIP Network.
· VoIP Session and Application Hacking.
· Social Threats.
The second chapter of this paper provides a brief and
concise description of the most frequently used attacks. We
tried to focus on finding out which of the attacks offers the
biggest potential as a future threat and if there is an
effective defence against it. The third chapter deals with
two tools, SPITFILE and AntiSPIT. While we developed
the first one to demonstrate a way to implement and
launch SPIT, the latter illustrates the implementation of
protection against SPIT into Asterisk (open-source PBX)
which is based on ideas of authors originating in the
statistical blacklist method. The final section provides our
conclusions and summarizes the acquired knowledge.
2. Possible Attacks in VoIP and
Protection against Them
All telecommunication channels, including VoIP, are
subject to attacks. These may include interception,
modification, or even a data loss during transport. SIP
protocol is in particular very susceptible to redirection,
modification, or termination of the calls. Moreover in IP
telephony, it is not possible to line up individual packets to
front and analyze them by return because the
communication happens in real time. This is the main
difference between the proposed security mechanisms for
classical Internet services and VoIP.
2.1 Scanning and Enumerating a VoIP
Network
This is not a case of a true VoIP attack. However, if
someone wants to attack the individual components of
VoIP infrastructure, he has to locate them in the network
and try to get as much information about these VoIP
elements and infrastructure as possible. This is how
scanning and enumerating tools work.
If he is able to obtain information about individual
devices then he can plan the next steps of attack. VoIP
infrastructure also comprises elements other than just
VoIP phones and servers. Because the availability and
security of VoIP networks relies so heavily on supporting
infrastructure, an attacker could focus only on devices
running VoIP services. It behoves him to identify and map
out other core network devices, including routers and VPN
gateways, web servers, TFTP servers, DNS servers, DHCP
servers, RADIUS servers, firewalls, intrusion prevention
systems, and session border controllers to name a few.
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For instance, if an attacker was able to locate and
disqualify TFTP server, several models of phones trying to
download configuration files on bootup might crash or
stall. If we should mention specific tools which can be
used for realization this type of attacks we can choose
Nmap [5] for network scan and SIPSCAN [4] to get the list
of SIP accounts from SIP server.
Protection Against Scanning and Enumerating
Attacks
A well configured firewall or LAN divided into
several virtual subnets (VLAN), with separate servers from
the end devices, will guarantee at least a partial defence
against automatic bots.
2.2 Exploiting the VoIP Network
This category includes attacks which enable
obtaining detail information about the VoIP component,
restrict its function, or eavesdrop calls/data that was made
between the components. These types of attacks are the
most widespread and include Denial of Service (DoS), or
Man-in-the-Middle (MITM).
Denial of Service (DoS)
DoS [2, 3] affects various types of IP networks
services (see Fig. 1). Subscribers are not able to use their
services properly or the function of services is limited and
marked as unusable. First, we will describe the
implementation of the DoS flaw. In this case, the attacker
send modified packets, or sequence of packets, through a
“flaw” in VoIP component implementation.
Fig. 1. DoS attacks on different software layer
These packets may be very long and syntactically
incorrect which causes a VoIP component to fail as it is
not implemented to handle such packets. Another example
of an attack is Flood DoS. The primary feature of this
attack is that the target component is flooded by many
flood packets and then this component is not able to work
with legitimate VoIP communication packets. Legitimate
packets are either ignored or processed very slowly and the
VoIP service becomes unusable. One variant of this type of
attack is that the flood packets cause the target system to
allocate resources or consume processing power while
waiting for a response that will never be sent. Another
variant is a Distributed DoS. Multiple systems are used to
generate a massive volume of packets so that the target
systems are flooded. Another type of DoS is Application-
level DoS which consist of manipulation and changes to
VoIP service properties. For example, hijacking the
registration  data  for  an  IP  phone  can  cause  a  loss  of  any
inbound call.
Based on the type of protocol (Signal or Transport)
we can also determine which DoS attack will be applied.
With the signal protocol, DoS attack can assault any part
of the VoIP system because every VoIP component must
process  signalling.  In  case  of  a  stateful  SIP  server  the
probability of successful DoS attack is higher than with a
stateless SIP server because the stateful one requires a
large volume of computation to be carried out by the
server. As VoIP components very rarely use strong
authentication, the probability that the attack will be
successful is rather high. Besides, most firewalls do not
prevent possible DoS at the level of signal protocols.
Real-time Transport Protocol (RTP) is the most
frequently used transport protocol. In comparison with
signal protocols, RTP is very simple and its
implementation is almost without errors. That is why the
DoS implementation flaw is not a good choice for possible
attack. However, the RTP protocol is very vulnerable to
flood attacks as the data are transmitted in real time and
the attacker can flood any of VoIP components (IP phone,
WAN link etc.). Udpflood [4] or SiVus [6] are for example
the good choice for flood based DoS.
Man-in-the-Middle (MITM)
In this case, the attacker is located between two
communicating parties and he is trying to intercept and
alter the data stream direction between the subscribers.
This attack has a general designation - Man-in-the-middle
[1], or MITM. MITM attack can capture data between
participants, and also eavesdrop intercepted calls.
Nowadays the most used MITM method is called ARP
Poisoning. The method works with the fact, that some
systems receive and save an ARP entry in its ARP cache,
regardless on the previously sent or not sent ARP request.
This means that an attacker can fool one or both
subscribers to think that the attacker MAC address is the
address of the other computer or SIP server. At this
moment the attacker becomes a mediator between the
subscribers and may eavesdrop or modify any
communication between them. In practice, we can realize
ARP Poisoning through five general points:
· Determine both of subscribers' MAC addresses.
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· Sending an unsolicited ARP reply to subscriber A, so
as to indicate that the MAC address of B was
changed to the MAC address of the attacker.
· Sending an unsolicited ARP reply to subscriber B so
as  to  indicate  that  the  MAC  address  of  A  was
changed to the MAC address of the attacker.
· Attacker allows IP forwarding on his computer, so
data will pass freely between subscriber A and
subscriber B.
· The attacker will capture and monitor data, or
eavesdrop the calls.
The best tool to implement the ARP Poisoning is
Cain and Abel [7].
Protection Against DoS
System hardening - hardening is based on removing
unnecessary or unusable network services, locking down
the operating system and using an internal detection
system.
Strong authentication - VoIP components need to be
sure that they are communicating with a legitimate
subscriber. This ensures that all unauthorised attempts are
recognized and aborted.
Traditional firewall -  FW  can  provide  a  very  good
protection against DoS. It mitigates the attack at
individual levels. Firewalls provide a good security mainly
in corporate networks where the VoIP is carried out over
unsecured networks. Firewall can provide the following
protection against DoS attacks:
DoS implementation flaw
· Monitor for known VoIP attack patterns and discard
packets accordingly.
· Monitor for new forms of attacks and discard packets
accordingly.
Flood DoS
· Perform signalling and media rate limiting.
· When a DoS flood is detected, quickly discard
obviously malicious packets.
· Allow packets from authenticated sources.
· Maintain adequate bandwidth for known, good calls.
· Monitor for and drop rogue RTP streams.
· Monitor for and drop rogue RTP packets which are
targeting active RTP streams.
· Monitor for and drop illegitimate packets which carry
high QoS markings.
Application-level DoS
· Monitor for and counter external attacks such as
registration hijacking and illegal teardowns.
Protection Against MITM
Strict rules on the switch ports in the local
network - manually entered MAC addresses and their
authorization for each switch port guarantee a strong
protection against possible attackers.
LAN divided into VLAN subnets - provides an
additional level of security against simple MITM attacks.
Encryption - On the third layer of the OSI model, we
can use an IPsec and VPN tunnels, on the fourth transport
layer SRTP and ZRTP on the application layer. ZRTP has
been designed mainly as a good protection against Man-
in-the-Middle. In the case of SIP, we can use TLS
encryption.
Applications for ARP Poisoning detection - For Linux an
arpwatch [4]. This tool watches mapping MAC to IP
addresses on the whole ARP protocol route. The
equivalent for MS Windows is Xarp [8].
2.3 VoIP Session and Application Hacking
In the previous chapters, we covered several forms of
service disruption in which malformed packets or packet
floods disrupted service for SIP proxies and SIP phones. In
this chapter, we cover other attacks in which an attacker
manipulates SIP signaling or media to hijack or otherwise
manipulate calls. As with other attacks we have covered,
these attacks are simple to execute and rather lethal.
Build-up Call Aborting
If the attacker wants to abort a built-up call, the SIP
packet with SIP BYE method needs to be created. The
client will receive this packet only if the call identification
alias Call-ID is the same.
ACK sip:7204@158.196.146.12;transport=udp
SIP/2.0
Via: SIP/2.0/UDP
158.196.192.32:47998;branch=z9hG4bK-d8754z-
429c98f2694bf547-1---d8754z-;rport
Max-Forwards: 70
To: <sip:7204@158.196.146.12>;tag=as06fb1164
From:
"7002"<sip:7002@158.196.146.12>;tag=9197c599
Call-ID:
NzhkNmM2YzZhZDk3NjhmMDUwYTJjZWY5ZWVkMzY4MWM.
CSeq: 1 ACK
Content-Length: 0
Fig. 2. Original ACK packet
The best packet for this modification is an ACK
packet (Fig. 2). This packet confirms a build-up call from
the caller to the called subscriber. We only need to change
one element in the packet: the ACK method for BYE (Fig.
3). If the modified packet is sent to the called subscriber’s
address, the phone will react as if the caller has ended the
call. The transaction between subscribers is controlled by a
branch parameter. A tag parameter which is randomly
generated to identify a target can be the same as the
original.
BYE sip:7204@158.196.146.12 SIP/2.0
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Via:SIP/2.0/UDP158.196.192.32:47998;branch=z9
hG4bK-d8754z-f773bbf8da513d54-1---d8754z-
;rport
Max-Forwards: 70
To: <sip:7204@158.196.146.12>;tag=as640fa018
From:
"7002"<sip:7002@158.196.146.12>;tag=9197c599
Call-ID:
NzhkNmM2YzZhZDk3NjhmMDUwYTJjZWY5ZWVkMzY4MWM.
CSeq: 2 BYE
Content-Length: 0
Fig. 3. Modified BYE packet
RTP Data Redirecting
We have to modify SDP packet content for RTP
packet redirecting. The packet content can be seen on the
figure 4.  This protocol defines the IP address and the port
which is used during the call. If the attacker has modified
these data, subscriber’s VoIP client will send an audio
stream to a different address and port which is a legitimate
subscriber’s address.
v=0
o=- 0 2 IN IP4 158.196.192.32
s=CounterPath Bria
c=IN IP4 158.196.192.32
t=0 0
m=audio 58940 RTP/AVP 0 8 3 101
a=sendrecv
a=rtpmap:0 PCMU/8000
a=rtpmap:8 PCMA/8000
a=rtpmap:3 GSM/8000
a=rtpmap:101 telephone-event/8000
a=fmtp:101 0-15
Fig. 4. Packet with INVITE from the client to the proxy server
v=0
o=- 0 2 IN IP4 195.113.113.147
s=CounterPath Bria
c=IN IP4 195.113.113.147
t=0 0
m=audio 58940 RTP/AVP 0 8 3 101
a=sendrecv
a=rtpmap:0 PCMU/8000
a=rtpmap:8 PCMA/8000
a=rtpmap:3 GSM/8000
a=rtpmap:101 telephone-event/8000
a=fmtp:101 0-15
Fig. 5. Changed packet from the proxy server
Changed IP addresses are in o and c parameter, port
value is changed in m parameter (Fig. 5). All attacks
shown in this part have been realized using Scapy [9].
Protection Against Session and Application
Hacking
SIP over TCP - If you use the TCP protocol instead
of  the  standard  UDP,  SIP  UAs  to  establish  a  permanent
connection between themselves or with the SIP server. For
the attacker in this case is difficult to handle registration
because TCP uses sequence numbers for each connection.
Another advantage is, that we can use the TLS protocol
which provides strong encryption and authentication.
Enable authentification - Set up authentication for
REGISTER and INVITE requests. For REGISTER
messages we can use strong passwords, because these
messages are not exchanged between the SIP server and
SIP phone as often as INVITE messages.
Reduction of the registration interval - The second
proposed defence is to reduce the interval between
registrations. By default, this interval is set to 3600
seconds. If we set the time for example on 60 seconds even
if the registration will be removed or hijacked, after
minute the phone will be active again.
Ports change - change the standard port for SIP
signaling protocol. It is default set to port 5060. This is a
very weak but popular protection.
2.4 Social Threats
Under this term we can imagine the attacks that are
not focused to obtain informations about the user’s
accounts, eavesdrop the sensitive data or attack VoIP
components in order to disrupt its function. The attacks
described in this chapter are designed to make calls with
advertising content and from the perspective of the victims
are very annoying. Such an attack is for example SPIT
(Spam over Internet Telephony), which is similar to e-mail
Spam.
The first type of SPIT is applied by the call centres
through which advertisement calls are managed by agents.
Subscribers who answer the phone are systematically or
randomly searched by computer and if they answer the
call, they are redirected to agents. Most advertising
messages are recited by agents. The volume of such
advertisement calls is in direct proportion to the number of
call agents. Another type of SPIT, so called ‘call bots’,
uses the same principle as the call centres except that there
are no call agents. The advertisement message is replayed
automatically from a computer. There is no need to
employ agents. Everything is administered by the
computer. Certain VoIP phones may receive an “alert-
info” SIP header. This header contains a internet link
under which the advertising message is recorded. The
message is played when the phone rings. When this type of
attack occurs, the calls cannot be answered. The issue can
be solved by turning off the internet ringing download on
the telephone set. This attack is known as Ringtone SPIT.
Most often, a combination of the above described
attacks is used as it increases the chance that the SPIT
attack will be successful.
Protection against SPIT
Buddylist/ Whitelist - Every subscriber has a list of
buddy subscribers. Those who are not on the list cannot
initiate a call. The problem arises when the subscribers
that are not on the list are regular callers and we would
like to speak to them. To allow the calls from subscribers
who are not on the whitelist is helpful to access a ’web of
trust’. Each subscriber grants his trust to several other
subscribers.
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Blacklist - This is a reversed whitelist. In this case,
the subscriber has a list of possible SPIT attackers and
these contacts do not have access to subscriber’s phone.
Statistical blacklist - Telephone providers carry out
different analyses and apply different statistical methods to
create a spammer list. If a caller makes hundreds of phone
calls during a short time span, s/he is very likely to be a
spammer.
Voice menu interaction - Before the caller is
actually put through to the called subscriber, the caller is
directed to the voice menu where he is asked to enter a
numeric code (for example 123*) to be able to get through
to the caller. This protection is effective against caller bots
(relatively until the bots take up using a speech
recognition).
Greylist - This is a modified blacklist (whitelist)
under which the phone returns the engaged line tone to the
caller who is making the call for the first time. This time,
the phone does not actually ring on the called subscriber.
If the caller attempts to make the connection again the call
is connected. It increases a likelihood that the caller is a
human person and not a SPIT bot.
Law aspects - As telecommunication is protected by
several laws, instances filtering mails or calls face several
legal consequences (for example imprisonment).
Therefore, it is mandatory not only to construct technical
filtering mechanisms, but also to consider implications
from telecommunication or privacy protection laws and
regulation.
3. The Implementation of SPIT and
Defence against this Attacks
This chapter is focused on an implementation of
Spam over Internet Telephony and a defence against this
type of threat.
3.1 Motivation
As we mentioned before, attacks on Internet services
become a very frequent issue in the global IP network.
Another threat is coming with IP telephony. The threat is
called SPIT and the acronym stands for Spam over
Internet Telephony (SPIT). If you take the fact that Spam
takes up 80-90% of the total number of attacks on Internet
services, the threat of SPIT in the future is very real and
dangerous. Many security experts also share this view. We
can say that the only reason why the SPIT has no global
impact yet is that it, as opposed to Spam, poses greater
requirements on computing power, hardware and network
connectivity. But this barrier will soon be removed by
increasing technological development. SPIT also has a
much greater annoying effect and impact on the victim
than Spam. Just imagine, unlike an incoming emails with
Spam, which you can easily ignore and delete, the new
attack containing SPIT advertising message will ring
again and again several times a day. That was the reason
why we started developing and implementing our own
tool. This tool is called SPITFILE [4] and it is based on
well-known SIP packet generator Sipp. Next subchapter
deals with SPITFILE application which is programmed in
Python and it should demonstrate how easy it is to
generate this type of attack. Of course, the methods of
protection against this attack are mentioned too. We also
made a model of an effective defence against SPIT which
we implemented into software IP PBX Asterisk and it has
been given a name AntiSPIT. AntiSPIT is based on a call
rating factor and blacklist table, together it provides a
good protection against SPIT.
3.2 SPITFILE
During the development process, we put much
emphasis on the simplicity of using and generating SPIT
attacks. This decision was made on the ground of a study.
We got acquainted with a few implementations of VoIP
generators which were suitable for SPIT attack but they
were mostly based on rather complex algorithms and
demanded good knowledge of Linux-based systems.
Therefore our aim was to design and then to implement a
SPIT attack into an application which would be user-
friendly and with an intuitive menu.
We opted for Python to develop our SPIT application.
Python is a high-level programming language similar to
Perl or Tcl. The objective of designed application is to
generate the phone calls and to replay a pre-recorded voice
message.
We  had  to  find  a  suitable  SIP  generator  which  we
could modify. As an acceptable candidate was adopted an
application SIPp [10] which focuses on testing and
simulating SIP calls in VoIP infrastructure. SIPp is a
open-source test tool or traffic generator for the SIP
protocol. SIPp can read custom XML scenario files
describing from very simple to complex call flows and also
send media traffic through RTP.
Two methods were used for dynamic cooperation
with parameters inserted into SIPp and XML. The
variables corresponds to appropriate parameters inserted
by user and they are sent to SIPp application to initialize a
voice call. For the values which have to be dynamically
inserted into XML file, a new function was created,
enabling to search and to change a particular value. We
use a library xml.dom.minidom [11] for handling XML
files.
Our application called SPITFILE implements a
graphic interface for SIPp and works with ready-made
.xml diagrams. Thus, the simulation of a SPIT attack is
much simpler. SPITFILE was programmed in Python
using wxPython GUI [12], [13].
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Its control is very intuitive – the requested values are
submitted into relevant fields and the SPIT attack is
launched by clicking the SEND button. SPITFILE is only
available for Linux distribution now but the source code
for Windows should be completed soon too. For a proper
operation of the SPITFILE application it is first necessary
to install the following packages: Python≥v2.6 ,Sipp≥v2.1,
Python-wxgtk≥v2.6. Our application can generate two
types of attacks.
Direct Mode
It  generates  SPIT  on  IP  phone  directly  in  the  local
network without using the VoIP PBX (some IP phones can
refuse a direct calls that avoid SIP Proxy, the Proxy mode
is more suitable for such cases). SPITFILE in Direct mode
is depicted on Figure 6. It is necessary to fill in mandatory
information which is used to launch the prepared attack.
Fig. 6. SPITFILE in Direct Mode
Proxy Mode
It generates SPIT via VoIP PBX (SIP Proxy) and the
attack thereupon can run against anything that is available
behind the Proxy, theoretically involving not only IP
phones but also ordinary phones and the whole telephone
world. As well as in Direct mode in Proxy mode (Fig. 7), it
is also necessary to fill in compulsory information needed
to create the SPIT attack.
Fig. 7. SPITFILE in Proxy Mode
In addition, it is necessary to obtain a user account
because a successful registration at SIP Registrar is
required before the calls via SIP Proxy can be performed.
It is the main difference between Direct and Proxy modes.
The attacker should obtain a valid account at SIP Proxy.
There exist many ways how to obtain the username and
password, for example applications Cain and Abel or
SIPcrack [9]. Both applications are a tool for sniffing and
cracking the digest authentication [3] which is used in the
SIP protocol.
A concept of SPIT attack (Fig. 8.) can be performed
in a few steps:
1. The attacker fills in the SPITFILE application form.
2. The inserted parameters are used in the chosen
scenario generated in XML file for SIPp.
3. SPITFILE creates a command consisting of defined
parameters.
4. SIPp is launched and the phone call is initialized by
XML file.
5. SIPp is automatically terminated after call
disconnection but SPITFILE is running and is ready
to launch next scheduled attack.
Fig. 8. SPITFILE Draft
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Before SPITFILE can be opened, preconfigured .xml
diagrams (direct.xml and proxy.xml) should be imported
into /etc/ directory. Afterwards we can launch SPITFILE
and choose one of the two above mentioned attacks that we
want to carry out.
To run SPITFILE, just type the following command
into the terminal: python <location of the SPITFILE.py
file>. In Direct mode, only target phone IP address,
number of calls, time between calls and finally an
advertisement message which will be played is needed to
be defined.
The called phone rings after the attack has been sent
and a pre-recorded voice message will be played after the
incoming call is answered. Course of an attack can be seen
as a requests and responses in SIPp application. (Fig. 9.)
SPITFILE has been tested with HW Grandstream IP
phones (GXP 2000, 3000) and with SW IP phones
(Sjphone and X-Lite).
The Proxy mode has additional fields such as the
required account which is consequently used for
registration, such as SIP number, username and password.
The other fields are the same as in the case of previous
Direct type. We have tested Asterisk PBX and Siemens
hipath4000 PBX.
Now,  how  can  one  defend  against  such  a  type  of
attacks? There are several theoretical methods [14], [15]
which can be implemented to protect the VoIP equipments
from SPIT attacks. These methods were described in
chapter Protection Against SPIT. Everyone can assess how
useful they are and whether they are suitable for a practical
implementation.
Fig. 9. Sipp Started by SPITFILE
3.3 AntiSPIT
Irrespective of the types of defence mentioned in the
previous part, we tried to design and create our own model
of security application based on Blacklist which would
provide an efficient defence against SPIT, the name
AntiSPIT [4] has been given to the new application.
Fig. 10. AntiSPIT Concept
AntiSPIT is able to analyse and process input data
from Call Detail Records (CDR’s) and consequently
determine whether the used source will be inserted into
blacklist. CDR's are an integral part of every PBX and we
decided to implement AntiSPIT into Asterisk PBX. The
application gives an output which is inserted as a
command which can control the blacklist. Asterisk
provides CLI interface enabling us to create or delete the
particular records in the blacklist database.
The whole concept acts as an effective tool and
provides a SPIT recognition and consequently a protection
against SPIT attacks. In principle, the main idea of this
proposed method is based on the human behaviour in case
of an unwanted call. The called party terminates the
unwanted call early after the SPIT call is answered and the
reaction gets quicker when it reoccurs. The called party
terminates such repeating SPIT call in a substantially
shorter time interval than in the previous case. This
concept is shown in Figure 10.
In this case, we can monitor the call duration from
CDR’s where every call has stored a record and if the call
duration is less than a certain interval (duration), the
source of the calls will receive the status of suspicious
caller  and  a  record  with  rating  is  created.  In  the  case  of
repeated suspicious behaviour the rating will be increased.
The record includes sender's called ID (S_CallID),
receivers called ID (R_CallID), rating and will be listed in
the table named Suspicious Calls Table (hereafter SCT).
The maximum achieved rating factor represents a
threshold limit value that makes a decision about whether
the record from SCT is put onto Blacklist table (BLT). If
this record is transferred into BLT then a caller stated in
such  a  log  can  not  carry  out  inbound  calls  for  a  specific
time interval (time). The BLT record contains sender's
called ID (S_CallID), receivers called ID (R_CallID), and
time interval determining the ban (time). After expiration
of the ban time the rating of the record is reduced by one
and is transferred back to SCT.
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However, if the inbound call is repeatedly marked as
a suspicious and the threshold rating factor value is
exceeded it will be put back onto the Blacklist table, this
time for a longer period of the ban time (time + x). At the
same time, as the record is inserted into the Blacklist table
database put blacklist <number> command is generated
for PBX Asterisk CLI. After the ban time expiration the
record is returned to SCT and database del blacklist
<number> command is sent Asterisk CLI.
Callers who have a record in the SCT can also reduce
their rating value and it is also possibly to fully remove
them from SCT. Once the caller carries out a call with a
longer duration than the set threshold limit (duration) and
his S_CallID is a part of the record in the SCT, then the
suspicion mark is consequently reduced by 1. If the caller
does not have a record in the SCT then he is a certified
subscriber and no action is required. The process is
denoted in Fig. 10.
AntiSPIT has been created in LAMP environment -
meaning Linux, Apache web server, MySQL databases
and PHP. AntiSPIT offers user-friendly administration
through a web front-end  (Fig. 11) enabling a user to set
the key parameters such as length of call interval
(duration), maximum achieved rating factor (max rating),
ban time (time). The web front-end  also enables
monitoring and the management of both SCT table and
BLT table.The AntiSPIT can be downloaded and freely
distributed under the GPL.
In the future we would like to test the AntiSPIT
system and its effectiveness to prevent SPIT attack. The
biggest problem implementing the test is the fact that it is
necessary that the test sample contains a sufficient number
of persons, while that persons did not know that are the
goal of testing. However, these conditions are very difficult
to reach, because from the ethically point of view it is not
allowed to send SPIT attacks on users without their
consciousness, in addition to a large extent of people who
would be needed for the test.
Fig. 11. AntiSPIT Web Interface
4. Conclusion
The technical report dealt with VoIP attacks and
methods to initiate such attacks and a defence. We divided
threats into several categories and mentioned the specific
techniques on how to apply these attacks in real-case. Our
task was to determine which of the attacks are currently
the biggest threat for VoIP networks and analyse potential
risks and defences against them.
For this purpose, we developed a SPITFILE
application and AntiSPIT. Some of the above described
security measures or combination thereof should be
implemented in every IP ready PBX. This should enhance
the protection against SPIT attacks.
However, as effective SPIT attack methods are being
developed very fast, further intensive research is needed to
guarantee the security of VoIP systems.
Fortunately, most telephone calls are charged which
functions as a brake but we cannot not rely on it. SPIT is a
threat hanging over the telephony world like the sword of
Damocles. We hope that applications such as AntiSPIT
will help us to define and develop the idea how to defend
against the new SPIT attacks and how to break this
imaginary sword.
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